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"THE DOOR IS STILL AJAR" FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS*
Beth Stephenst
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain1 ended over two decades of suspense about the modern
application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), an eighteenth-
century statute that has been used since 1980 as the basis for
international human rights litigation in federal courts. The
Court announced that "the door is still ajar" to such litigation,
© 2004 Beth Stephens. All Rights Reserved.
Professor, Rutgers-Camden School of Law. I submitted an amicus brief to
the Supreme Court in support of Alvarez-Machain, on behalf of fifty international
human rights organizations. I have participated on the side of the plaintiffs in several
of the human rights cases discussed in this article, as counsel, through amicus briefs,
or as a consultant.
124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). One of the many disputes about the statute
concerned its proper name, Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) or Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
Some opponents complained that labeling the statute "ATCA" pre-judged the key
interpretive question as to whether it authorized "claims." Although I have long been a
proponent of ATCA, largely because it forms an acronym that can be said out loud, I
switch with this article to ATS, the name adopted by the Supreme Court in Sosa, 124
S. Ct. at 2746.
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although "subject to vigilant doorkeeping."' Sosa affirmed the
cautious approach adopted by most of the lower courts and left
the door open for current and future cases that address the
most egregious violations of international law.
Adopted in 1789 by the first Congress, the Alien Tort
Statute states, "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." In 1980, Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala' interpreted
the statute to permit claims for modern human rights
violations Since that decision, the statute has prompted
intense scrutiny and triggered hundreds of law review articles
and media reports, and multiple executive branch
interventions.7 This interest far outstrips the actual results of
the litigation: most ATS cases have been dismissed, only about
two dozen cases have produced final judgments under the
statute, and only one judgment has led to the collection of
significant damages. ATS cases attract disproportionate
attention because of a compelling combination of human
drama, human rights principles, foreign policy, and complex
questions of international, constitutional, and statutory law.
Following Fildrtiga, every court to reach a decision on
the issue concluded that the first Congress intended the ATS to
permit federal claims for violations of international law. The
courts struggled, however, to articulate a theory to explain that
result. After several denials of petitions for certiorari, the
Supreme Court agreed last year to consider the proper
interpretation of the statute. The Court traced a careful path
through the available evidence to conclude that at the time the
statute was enacted, Congress intended it to grant federal
courts jurisdiction over common law claims for a narrow set of
international law violations. The Court then held that the
statute today continues to afford jurisdiction over comparable
modern violations of international law. The opinion is replete
with cautionary language. But both the careful tone and the
' 124 S. Ct. at 2764.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Aside from minor updates in terminology, the
language is identical to that of the original, which was enacted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6Id.
Westlaw recorded 1847 articles citing "Fildrtiga" or "alien tort" as of
August 2004, before the likely explosion of articles discussing the Sosa decision.
' See infra text accompanying notes 17-19.
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actual wording of the standard mirror the narrow holding of
the Fildrtiga decision and most of the cases that followed,
indicating that most of the lower court precedents remain
valid.
This article begins in Part I with an overview of the pre-
Sosa development of the ATS. After a description of the history
of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in Part II, Part III explains how the
Supreme Court reconciled the intent of the late-eighteenth-
century drafters of the statute with the jurisprudential
demands of our modern judicial system, and Part IV analyzes
the standard the case develops. Sosa left several contentious
issues unresolved. First, the case did not involve the most
controversial current ATS cases, claims against corporate
defendants sued for complicity in human rights violations.
Debate about Sosa's impact on those cases has already begun,
and is addressed in Part V. Finally, Part VI discusses an
obtuse footnote in which the Court left open the role of the
executive branch in urging the courts to dismiss claims that
impinge upon executive control of foreign affairs, a process that
is likely to be highly disputed in future litigation.
Who won and who lost in Sosa? The varied media
accounts reflect the efforts by all sides to "spin" the
interpretation of the Sosa opinion.' Those who viewed the ATS
as placing the federal courts at the cutting edge of the
progressive development of international human rights norms
have been disappointed. The Court limited ATS claims to
clearly defined norms that have already attained general
acceptance. Those who sought to derail all ATS litigation or to
rescue corporations from ATS liability have also been
disappointed. But the decision is a clear victory for those
human rights advocates who view the statute as a means to
hold the most egregious perpetrators accountable for the most
egregious violations of international law.
Compare Robert S. Greenberger & Pui-Wing Tam, Human Rights Suits
Against U.S. Firms Curbed, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2004, at A3 (quoting counsel for
Unocal Oil Corporation stating that Sosa represents a "sound rejection" of human
rights litigation and "is a nail in the coffin" of suits against businesses) with Reni
Gertner, Human Rights Claims Against Corporations May Go Forward, LAW. WKLY.
USA, July 19, 2004, at 1 (quoting William Aceves, a professor who submitted an
amicus brief in support of Alvarez, stating that the court 'has given a green light to
litigation under the Alien Tort Statute.").
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I. THE PRE-SOSA EVOLUTION OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In the early 1970s attorneys at the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) identified the Alien Tort Statute
as the basis for claims of violations of international law.'0 CCR
put the discovery to use just a few years later, when Dolly
Fildrtiga came to CCR seeking justice for the murder of her
brother, Joelito Filirtiga. Joelito had been tortured to death in
1976 in Paraguay by a Paraguayan police officer in retaliation
for his father's opposition to the military dictatorship." The
family discovered the police officer living in Brooklyn and
brought suit against him under the ATS seeking damages for
torture, a tort in violation of the law of nations. The District
Court dismissed the lawsuit, relying on Second Circuit dicta
stating that international law did not apply to a government's
treatment of its own citizens.2
The Second Circuit reinstated the claim on appeal,
ruling that the ATS incorporates modern, evolving
international law norms and that international law prohibits
offenses such as torture even when committed within national
borders." In a brief requested by the Second Circuit, the Carter
administration strongly supported this interpretation of the
statute. 4  The Fildrtiga decision closes with a ringing
endorsement of the power of human rights norms:
In the twentieth century the international community has come to
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of
basic human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture...
. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like
the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind. Our holding today, giving effect to a
jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small but
"0 See discussion of pre-Fildrtiga application of the ATS in BETH STEPHENS &
MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 9 (1996).
" The facts of the case are described in Fil.rtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980). See RICHARD ALAN WHITE, BREAKING SILENCE: THE CASE THAT
CHANGED THE FACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004), for a detailed history of the Fildrtiga
family's attempts to seek justice in both Paraguay and through U.S. litigation.
12 FilArtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
"s "[I]nternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis
their own governments." 630 F.2d at 885. Past cases holding that violations committed
by a state against its own citizens do not violate international law are "clearly out of
tune with the current usage and practice of international law." Id. at 884.
' See Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-
6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980).
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important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all
people from brutal violence. 5
Later cases generally followed the lead of the Fildrtiga
court and often adopted its passionate tone as well. Although a
split panel of the D.C. Circuit failed to reach a decision on the
meaning of the statute,"6 federal courts from several other
circuits applied the Fildrtiga holding to award damages for
human rights violations committed in countries such as the
Philippines, Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Bosnia-Herzegovina."
The decisions recognized a small core of actionable human
rights violations in addition to torture, including summary
execution, disappearance, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, slavery, and arbitrary detention.'8 The courts also
recognized that liability attaches to commanders and others
complicit in the abuses, as well as to the individuals who
actually inflict harm.'9
Despite an outpouring of law review commentary, the
Fildrtiga line of cases triggered little controversy through most
of the 1990s. Most of the defendants were foreign individuals
and most cases resulted in default judgments that could not be
enforced against those defendants.0 In the late 1990s, however,
cases filed against multinational corporations began to draw
attention. The corporate cases built on the recognition that
some international law norms apply to private actors.2 Private
' 630 F.2d at 890.
'6 The three judges on the D.C. Circuit panel filed separate opinions in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
"7 Cases upholding ATS claims include, for example, Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996) (Philippines); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996) (Ethiopia); Kadic v. Karad.id, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (Bosnia-Herzegovina); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (Guatemala).
"8 See, e.g., Hilao, 103 F.3d at 795 (arbitrary detention, torture); Abebe-Jira,
72 F.3d at 845-46 (torture, summary executions, arbitrary detention); Kadic, 70 F.3d at
236-37, 242-43 (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, summary execution,
torture); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184 (summary execution, torture, disappearance,
arbitrary detention).
" See, e.g., Hilao, 103 F.3d at 795 (commanding officer); Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. at 187-89 (same).
' For discussion of ATS cases and default judgments, see STEPHENS &
RATNER, supra note 10, at 20-23, 175.
" In a case filed against the head of the unrecognized, de facto government of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Second Circuit held that the prohibition against genocide
applies to private persons, as well as state actors. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42. The court
also held that the defendant could be held liable for a violation that requires state
action when acting in complicity with the public officials of the former Yugoslavia. Id.
at 245.
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corporations can therefore be held liable both when they act in
complicity with state actors and when they commit violations
that do not require state action, such as crimes against
humanity, slavery, and forced labor. In Doe v. Unocal
Corporation, for example, Burmese citizens charged that the oil
corporation had acted in complicity with the Burmese military
and was therefore responsible for violations that included
forced labor and torture." A few cases filed against
multinational corporations have survived preliminary motions,
although none has yet produced a final judgment.' The
response in the business and conservative press was largely
negative and opponents began efforts to derail ATS litigation. 4
The U.S. executive branch's position on ATS suits also
has changed dramatically.25 The Reagan administration filed a
poorly reasoned opposition to the Fildrtiga interpretation of the
ATS in Trajano v. Marcos, but largely let the issue drop, as
did the first Bush administration. The Clinton administration
2 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84, 892 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(decision denying motion to dismiss). See also Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d
1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (decision granting motion for summary judgment), affd in part,
rev'd in part by No. 00-56603, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), reh'g en
banc granted, No. 00-56603, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003). In December
2004, the parties announced a settlement in principle and removed the case from the
Ninth Circuit docket while they finalized the tentative agreement. Neither side would
disclose details of the settlement. Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al.
2' See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1233
(N.D. Cal. 2004); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253
(N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d
Cir. 2000).
24 See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K MITROKOSTAS,
AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (2003); Cait Murphy, Is This
the Next Tort Trap? Using an Ancient Statute, Lawyers Make Business Quake,
FORTUNE, June 23, 2003, at 30; Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2003, at A16; Corporate Ethics: Big oil's dirty secrets, ECONOMIST, May 10,
2003, at 53; Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power - US Courts Should Not Punish
Companies for Human Rights Violations Committed Overseas, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2003, at 12.
' See Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169,
181 (2004) [hereinafter Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances]. Compare
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, 13, Filcrtiga v. Pefia-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) (Carter administration supporting
jurisdiction) with United States filings discussed infra notes 26-28.
26 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1980) (No. 86-2448) (Reagan administration offering restrictive
interpretation of the ATCA); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curium), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Reagan administration opposing certiorari).
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was largely supportive." Not until the administration of George
W. Bush did the cases come under concerted attack by the
executive branch, an attack that was repeated before the
Supreme Court in the Sosa litigation.'
II. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
Humberto Alvarez-Machain is the unlikely centerpiece
of a constitutional, diplomatic, and international law struggle
that has now lasted for almost two decades.' In 1985, Enrique
Camarena-Salazar, an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA), was captured, brutally tortured, and murdered
by drug traffickers in Mexico. Alvarez, a doctor, was indicted in
the United States, accused of participating in the crime by
keeping Camarena alive during the torture so that he could be
interrogated longer. Unable to extradite Alvarez to the United
States, the DEA hired a group of Mexicans to kidnap him. They
held him captive overnight in Mexico, then flew him to the
United States and delivered him to waiting DEA agents in
Texas. The lower courts dismissed the Alvarez indictment,
holding that the illegal kidnapping constituted "outrageous
governmental conduct." The Supreme Court reversed, ruling
that the manner of his seizure did not affect federal court
jurisdiction, and remanded the case for trial on the original
criminal indictment. The decision provoked an international
uproar.2 In 1992 the District Court granted Alvarez's motion
for judgment of acquittal, which ended the criminal
prosecution.
Alvarez filed a civil suit for damages against Jos6
Francisco Sosa, one of the Mexican citizens responsible for his
detention, as well as against several DEA agents and the
United States government. Most of the claims and defendants
" See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069) (Clinton administration supporting
jurisdiction).
See Reply Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting
Petititioner at 1-2, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
540 U.S. 1045 (2003) (No. 03-339) (George W. Bush administration opposing
jurisdiction).
'2 The facts and procedural history are detailed in the first of the two
Alvarez-Machain Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 657-58 (1992), and summarized in the recent opinion, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004).
' See Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus Sovereign Right: The Kidnapping
of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 829
(1997) (detailing foreign government reaction to the Alvarez-Machain case).
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were dismissed after a series of motions and an interlocutory
appeal, leaving only Sosa and the U.S. government."1 The
district court entered a $25,000 judgment against Sosa for
arbitrary arrest and detention under the ATS, but dismissed
the false arrest claim against the U.S. government.32 A three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ATS judgment
against Sosa but reinstated the claim against the U.S.
government3' The Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case en
banc and, in a 6-5 decision, affirmed the panel decisions on
both claims2 All of the judges agreed that the ATS permits
claims for human rights violations; the dissenters disagreed
with the application of the statute to the Alvarez facts.'
Although the Supreme Court had denied several petitions for
certiorari review of ATS decisions in the past, the involvement
of the U.S. government, the sharply split Ninth Circuit
decision, and the increasing controversy over the proper
interpretation of the ATS led many commentators to predict,
correctly, that the Court would agree to review this decision.
The Supreme Court opinion addressed both the false
arrest claim against the U.S. government and the ATS claim
against Sosa. Although the focus of this article is the ATS
analysis in Sosa, a brief summary of the false arrest claim
offers additional background.
The United States is subject to suit pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes suits for
injuries "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred. " ' The Ninth Circuit held that, under the
FTCA, the United States could be held liable for false arrest, a
S Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000), the U.S. government may substitute
itself as the defendant in place of individual government employees sued for acts
committed while acting within the scope of their employment.
32 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
' Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001),
reh'g en banc granted, 284 F.3d 1039, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002).
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
Four of the dissenting judges would have held that the treatment of
Alvarez did not constitute a violation of international or domestic law. Alvarez-
Machain, 331 F.3d at 645-46 (9th Cir. 2003) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting). The fifth
would have dismissed the claim as a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 659 (Gould,
J., dissenting).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000).
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tort." The FTCA, however, contains several limitations,
including a bar on FTCA suits for "[a]ny claim arising in a
foreign country."' The Ninth Circuit found this limitation
inapplicable because of the "headquarters doctrine," according
to which several circuits had held that a claim did not arise in
a foreign country if the decisions that led to the injury had been
made within the United States. 9 Applied to Alvarez, the
doctrine negated the foreign country limitation because DEA
officials in Washington, D.C. authorized the kidnapping and
detention in Mexico.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the U.S. government
claimed that Alvarez's detention did not constitute false arrest
because U.S. law authorized his detention in Mexico. The Court
did not reach this issue. Instead, the Court found that the case
fell within the FTCA's foreign country limitation. The Court
rejected the headquarters doctrine as a matter of statutory
construction, holding that Congress intended the foreign
country exception to apply whenever the harm complained of
occurred in a foreign country, regardless of where the chain of
events leading to the injury took place."' All of the Justices
agreed that the foreign country exception required dismissal of
the claim.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: THE
DRAFTERS' INTENT
Post-Fildrtiga, every court that reached a decision on an
ATS claim agreed that the statute authorized private civil
claims for universally recognized violations of international
human rights." That consensus, however, masked
disagreement about exactly how the statute worked. Sosa
resolved this dispute with an explanation that is consistent
with the available history and the likely intent of the statute.
17 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000).
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2748.
, Id. at 2752.
41 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. The two lone dissenting
voices were Judge Bork, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (Bork, J., concurring), and Judge
Randolph in Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145-49 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Randolph, J. concurring), rev'd and remanded by Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698-
99 (2004) (specifically noting ATS jurisdiction over claims).
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A. Competing Theories
The Alien Tort Statute as enacted stated that the
district courts "shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."" Two amendments updated the terminology without
any apparent intent to change the meaning, so that the statute
today reads in full: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. ' Some commentators viewed this language as a
straightforward grant of jurisdiction, nothing more." As a
jurisdictional grant, the statute would not by itself authorize
federal court claims. In addition to jurisdiction, a federal claim
must identify the source of the private right to sue, i.e., the
cause of action.
Modern cases found authorization for a private ATS
remedy through two theories. Fildrtiga held that the ATS
affords federal jurisdiction over international law claims: "[Wie
believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute,
not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the
federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized
by international law." This approach relied on the assumption
that international law can be the independent basis for a cause
of action, or private right to sue, in federal courts. If accurate,
however, there would arguably be no need for the ATS, for
international law claims would be covered by the general grant
of federal jurisdiction over claims "arising under" federal law.45
Thus, the Fildrtiga approach might prove too much.
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Federal Courts'Protective Jurisdiction Over
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479-80
(1986).
" The Second Circuit recognized this possibility but declined to rule on it in
Fildrtiga: "We recognize that our reasoning might also sustain jurisdiction under the
general federal question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We prefer, however, to rest our
decision upon the Alien Tort Statute, in light of that provision's close coincidence with
the jurisdictional facts presented in this case." Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
887 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing to Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959)). The Fildrtiga opinion is somewhat vague about the role played by
international law in other aspects of ATS litigation, leaving open the possibility that a
choice of law analysis might point to Paraguayan law, rather than international law.
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An alternative approach located the cause of action
within the statute itself. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, the
statute "creates a cause of action for violations of specific,
universal and obligatory international human rights
standards." Several courts drew support for this view from the
language "committed in violation of the law of nations,"
concluding that it implied a grant of a right to sue as well as
jurisdiction. 7 The theory that the ATS creates a cause of action
ran into its own difficulties. First, the use of the term
"cognizance" and the placement of the statute in a
jurisdictional act both imply only a jurisdictional grant.
Second, this argument also proved too much. When the statute
was enacted, it would have made no sense to create a statutory
cause of action for violations of international law. In the late-
eighteenth century, international law was part of the common
law and the common law was the basis for a right to sue
without further legislative action.'
The Supreme Court resolved the debate by working
carefully through the available information about the intent of
those who enacted the statute.
Id. at 889 n.25.
" In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994). See also
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) (statute "provid[es] both a
private cause of action and a federal forum where aliens may seek redress for
violations of international law."); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass.
1995) ("[Section] 1350 yields both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for
tortious violations of international law ... without recourse to other law as a source of
the cause of action.").
17 Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("T]he
'violation' language of section 1350 may be interpreted as explicitly granting a cause of
action.... ."). See also Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847 ("the 'committed in violation' language
of the statute suggests that Congress did not intend to require an alien plaintiff to
invoke a separate enabling statute as a precondition to relief under the Alien Tort
Claims Act."); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("The plain language
of the statute and the use of the words 'committed in violation' strongly implies that a
well pled tort[,J if committed in violation of the law of nations, would be sufficient [to
give rise to a cause of action].").
0 A related theory suggested that in enacting the ATS, Congress delegated to
the courts the power to develop federal common law remedies to redress torts in
violation of international law. "Congress, of course, may enact a statute that confers on
the federal courts jurisdiction over a particular class of cases while delegating to the
courts the task of fashioning remedies that give effect to the federal policies underlying
the statute." Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848 (citing Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)). This theory was also attacked as out of tune with the
jurisprudence of the time: given that the common law was understood to establish
causes of action, the first Congress would not have understood the Lincoln Mills
approach. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 358-59 (1997).
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B. The Supreme Court's Resolution
The Supreme Court made short shrift of the argument
that the ATS creates a cause of action, calling that reading of
the statute "implausible."'5 The Court focused on the statute's
use of the term "cognizance," which "bespoke a grant of
jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law."5' The Court
also found important the placement of the statute within the
Judiciary Act, "a statute otherwise exclusively concerned with
federal-court jurisdiction."' Finally, the Court observed that
"the distinction between jurisdiction and cause of action [would
not] have been elided by the drafters of the Act or those who
voted on it.""' The Court concluded, "In sum, we think the
statute was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of
addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned
with a certain subject." '
But the Court also recognized the need to understand
"the interaction between the ATS at the time of its enactment
and the ambient law of the era":'
Sosa would have it that the ATS was stillborn because there could be
no claim for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing
adoption of causes of action. Amici professors of federal jurisdiction
and legal history take a different tack, that federal courts could
entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books,
because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been
recognized within the common law of the time.... We think history
and practice give the edge to this latter position.'
The Court reached its conclusion by looking first at the nature
of international law when the statute was enacted.
International law in the late-eighteenth century included the
law governing relations among states and the "more
pedestrian" law governing individuals when they acted across
state lines, as in the law merchant. But the Court found that
international law also included a "narrow set" of "hybrid
international norms" in which the "rules binding individuals





Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
Id. (citing Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739
(2004) (No. 03-339), available at 2004 WL 419425 (citations omitted)).
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for the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the norms
of state relationships."' As the Court observed, "It was this
narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a
judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious
consequences in international affairs, that was probably on
[the] minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference
to tort."57 Although primarily directed at setting rules of
behavior for individuals, these norms were also of concern to
governments because violations threatened to undermine
international relations.
Second, the Court recognized that the framers of the
Constitution and members of the first Congress were
"preoccup[iedl" with the hybrid norms because of the difficulty
they had faced ensuring compliance with international law
during the period of the Confederation.' The Continental
Congress repeatedly-and ineffectually-called upon the states
to enforce international law and provide remedies for
violations. Since the ATS echoes the language of these
resolutions as well as concerns expressed at the constitutional
convention, it seems designed to respond to this problem."
Finally, the Court noted that the available records
indicate that the statute was indeed intended to provide a
remedy for those injured by violations of international law
without further action by Congress:
[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not
pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf
for use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, some
day, authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to
make some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of
foreigners.'
The members of the first Congress were too concerned with
the consequences of violations of international law "to
believe that Congress would have enacted the ATS only to
leave it lying fallow indefinitely.""
The Court noted that the historical references to the
statute, though "sparse," support this view." In two cases
"' Id. at 2756.
57 id.
58 Id.
5' Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2756-57.
Id. at 2758.
I1 d. at 2758-59.
' Id. at 2759.
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decided within a few years of the enactment of the ATS, district
courts referring to the statute assumed that it would authorize
suit in appropriate cases without further congressional action.'
And a 1795 opinion by Attorney General William Bradford
stated clearly that a civil claim for a violation of the
international norms of neutrality could have been filed under
the ATS:
[Tihere can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have
been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit
in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given
to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in
violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States .. .
As the Court recognized, "it appears likely that
Bradford understood the ATS to provide jurisdiction over what
must have amounted to common law causes of action."'
On the basis of this review of the historical framework
and contemporary statements about the statute, the Court
concluded:
In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical
materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect
the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at
the time.'
Up to this point, the Sosa decision was unanimous. All
agreed ("or at least Justice Scalia does not dispute") that the
ATS is only jurisdictional and that it originally was "available
to enforce a small number of international norms that a federal
court could properly recognize as within the common law
enforceable without further statutory authority.""7 All also
agreed that modern application of the statute requires at least
caution for several reasons.68 First, the conception of both the
See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (stating
that the ATS provided jurisdiction for a claim for damages on behalf of a French
privateer); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 948 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (stating in
dictum that ATS did not apply because claim was not one "for a tort only").
" 1 Op. Att'y. Gen. 57, 59 (1795) (discussing the criminal and civil liability of
U.S. citizens who joined a French attack on a British colony in Sierra Leone).
" Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2759.
" Id. at 2761.
17 Id. at 2764.
" Id. at 2762-64. Justice Scalia, however, finds that these considerations do
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common law and the role of the federal courts in enforcing it
has changed since the eighteenth century.69 Second, the courts
are reluctant to recognize new rights of action without clear
guidance from Congress.7" Third, these cases touch upon
foreign affairs, an area constitutionally delegated to the
political branches. 7' And finally, Congress has indicated caution
in authorizing private rights to enforce international law
norms.
72
Despite its cautionary language, however, the Court
concluded that the statute operates in much the same way
today as it did in 1789: the ATS affords jurisdiction over
violations of international law that the federal courts, in the
exercise of their discretion, recognize as stating causes of
action. The Court held that international law violations today
that are of similar nature as those recognized in 1789 give rise
to a private right of action. The "narrow class of international
norms" actionable under the ATS are those "of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."
73
This final step in the majority's analysis provoked
Justice Scalia to dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas.74 Justice Scalia argued that changes in the
understanding of the common law have deprived modern
federal courts of the power to recognize common law claims
derived from international law. He maintained that the
eighteenth-century common law right to sue was based in the
now-discredited general common law. In the pre-Erie legal
system, federal courts interpreted and applied the general
common law to the disputes that came before them even if
otherwise governed by state common law. Erie rejected the
general common law, holding that all law was grounded in a
particular sovereign, either the federal or state government. 75
not merely point to the need of courts to be "circumspect," but rather explains "why
courts cannot possibly be thought to have been given, and should not be thought to
possess, federal-common-law-making powers with regard to the creation of private
federal causes of action for violations of customary international law." Id. at 2774
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 2762.
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762-63.
71 Id. at 2763.
Id.
7' Id. at 2761-62.
Id. at 2769 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Justice Scalia concluded that post-Erie, the federal courts can
no longer recognize a common law cause of action for violations
of international law.76
In rejecting Justice Scalia's absolutist approach, the
Supreme Court majority recognized that post-Erie federal
common law includes those aspects of the old general common
law that are peculiarly within the power of the federal
government, and that international law was and remains
within that area of federal control.77 Neither Erie nor
subsequent judicial or legislative developments have deprived
the federal courts of the power to recognize common law claims
based on international law. 7' The ATS lies "at the intersection
of the judicial and legislative powers,"79 utilizing the combined
powers of Congress and the federal courts. In the exercise of its
constitutional powers, Congress enacted a statute authorizing
the federal courts to adjudicate civil claims for violations of
international law. In the absence of congressional instructions
to the contrary, the courts should continue to do so. As the
Court declared, "it would be unreasonable to assume that the
First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all
capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply
because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet
on the road to modern realism." ° The federal courts had in the
76 This argument, developed by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith in a series
of articles, has been strenuously debated. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 327-30 (1997), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); and Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:
Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393
(1997).
, Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764 ("Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition
of new substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie
understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some
substantive law in a common law way.").
7 As the Court stated,
[N]o development in the two centuries from the enactment of § 1350 to the
birth of the modem line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (C.A. 2 1980), has categorically precluded federal courts from
recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law;
Congress has not in any relevant way amended § 1350 or limited civil
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past, and still have today, the power, in their discretion, to
recognize private claims to enforce international law norms.
The Court emphasized that this discretionary power to
recognize causes of action based upon violations of
international law should not be exercised as a general practice,
given all of the factors that militate against the exercise of
discretion in this area. The majority found in the ATS itself a
congressional instruction to do so only in the narrow realm
addressed by that statute." Not only did the First Congress
"assume[] that federal courts could properly identify some
international norms as enforceable in the exercise of § 1350
jurisdiction,"" but they enacted the statute "on the
congressional understanding that courts would exercise
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived
from the law of nations."' Thus, the ATS, a voice from the
congressional past, provides the guidance necessary to override
concerns about the exercise of judicial discretion to recognize
such claims.
Justice Scalia and other critics of modern ATS litigation
correctly note that the modern conception of international law
is different from that of the late-eighteenth century. Justice
Scalia claims to be more true to the intent of the framers when
he resists incorporation of modern human rights norms into a
jurisdictional grant that was drafted when international law
addressed distinct concerns. This originalist argument is not so
clear cut, however, given that the framers understood that
international law would evolve.' Efforts to limit the ATS to the
specific violations recognized in 1789 ignore the framers'
intentional use of a term-"the law of nations'-that they
expected to change over time. To limit the meaning of this
eighteenth-century statute to the kinds of violations recognized
at the time would ignore this important insight about the
" This interpretation explains why the courts will not recognize a cause of
action for all violations of international law with federal question jurisdiction granted
by 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "Section 1350 was enacted on the congressional understanding
that courts would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims
derived from the law of nations; and we know of no reason to think that federal-
question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable congressional
assumption." Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 n.19.
Id. at 2765 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2765 n.19 (emphasis added).
, See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to
"Define and Punish ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
447, 553-55 (2000) (discussing framers' understanding of the evolving nature of
international law).
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evolving body of international law norms. The majority of the
Court recognized this and incorporated the standard used by
the framers, rather than the particular violations, or even the
categories of violations, that the framers would have recognized
as falling within that standard.
Moreover, despite its cautionary language, the Sosa
opinion does not instruct the lower courts to apply in every case
the prudential concerns reviewed by the Court. After careful
consideration of the limitations on the discretionary powers of
the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court concluded that the
statute instructs the judiciary to exercise its discretion to
recognize common law claims for violations of certain
international human rights norms. Any claim that meets the
Sosa standard is properly within the scope of the statute.
IV. THE STANDARD: WHICH VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW?
The Court framed its development of an ATS standard
within an extended discussion of the need for great caution in
judicial recognition of a common law claim for international
law violations. It emphasized that "there are good reasons for a
restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should
exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind."' The
resulting standard, the Court states, is a narrow one that
recognizes that although "the door is still ajar" it is "subject to
vigilant doorkeeping."' The "narrow class of international
norms" actionable under the ATS are those "of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."87
[Flederal courts should not recognize private claims under federal
common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms i'amiliar when § 1350 was enacted. See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 163-180, n. a, 5 L. Ed. 57
(1820) (illustrating the specificity with which the law of nations
defined piracy).'
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The Court presented this standard-definite content
and widespread acceptance-as a stringent test intended to
prevent litigation of claims for lesser, more parochial, or
idiosyncratic prohibitions.
This cautious approach mirrors that applied by most of
the lower courts considering ATS claims before Sosa. The Court
recognized this, citing with approval the key lower court
decisions defining the reach of the ATS.' Fildrtiga held that an
actionable norm under the ATS must "command the 'general
assent of civilized nations"' and be capable of "clear and
unambiguous" definition.' This is identical to the standard
adopted in Sosa: in order to trigger ATS jurisdiction, an
international norm must be both generally accepted by
"civilized nations" and clearly and unambiguously defined. The
formulation in Fildrtiga, in turn, was based on Paquete
Habana, which was also relied on by Sosa. Paquete Habana
recognized that a binding international law norm must
command "the general assent of civilized nations" and
constitute "a settled rule of international law."' Fildrtiga
adopted this "stringent" standard." Even the evidence relied
The Court placed its standard squarely within the past precedents:
This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the reasoning
of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this
Court. See Filartiga, supra, at 890 ("[Flor purposes of civil liability, the
torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind"); Tel-Oren, supra, at 781
(Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the "limits of section 1350's reach"
be defined by "a handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable,
universal and obligatory norms"); see also In re Estate of Marcos Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (C.A. 9 1994) ("Actionable violations of
international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory").
Id. at 2765-66.
Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
91 Id. at 884.
175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900).
Fildrtiga relied heavily on the Paquete Habana approach to international
law:
Habana is particularly instructive for present purposes, for it held that the
traditional prohibition against seizure of an enemy's coastal fishing vessels
during wartime, a standard that began as one of comity only, had ripened
over the preceding century into "a settled rule of international law" by "the
general assent of civilized nations." Id. at 694, 20 S.Ct. at 297; accord, id. at
686, 20 S.Ct. at 297.... The requirement that a rule command the "general
assent of civilized nations" to become binding upon them all is a stringent
one. Were this not so, the courts of one nation might feel free to impose
idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying international
law.
Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 881. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004)
(quoting similar language in Paquete Habana). Fildrtiga similarly requires that courts
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upon by Sosa and Fildrtiga was similar: while noting that non-
self-executing treaties are not independently enforceable, Sosa
approved their use as evidence of binding customary
international law, as did Fildrtiga and as do most of the lower
court decisions.'
Sosa offered the definition of piracy in United States v.
Smith as a model for the modern application of the ATS. In
Smith, a defendant accused of piracy challenged the
constitutionality of a statute that punished "the crime of
piracy, as defined by the law of nations."" Daniel Webster,
representing the alleged pirates, argued that the law of nations
did not provide a sufficiently clear definition, claiming that
"[tihe writers on public law do not define the crime of piracy
with precision and certainty."" The Court rejected that
argument. Framing the issue in terms virtually identical to the
issue triggered by modern ATS cases, the court asked "whether
the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with
reasonable certainty."97
In the absence of an international agreement defining
piracy, the Court looked to scholarship, custom and domestic
judicial opinions to determine the international definition."
After reviewing multiple sources, the Court recognized a
general consensus that piracy was a "crime of a settled and
determinate nature," and that "whatever may be the diversity
of definitions, in other respects, all writers concur, in holding,
that robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea, animo
furandi, is piracy."' The Court therefore concluded that
defining the crime of piracy by reference to the law of nations
was sufficient and constitutional. 1" As a model for the modem
submit ATS claims to "a... searching... review," 630 F.2d at 887, and that norms be
of"mutual, and not merely several concern.... Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 888.
Compare Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767-68, with Fildrtiga, 630 F.2d at 882.
9 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 153-54 (1820) (quoting Act
of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 513 (1819)).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 160.
9' Id. at 160-61. ("What the law of nations on this subject is, may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by
the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and
enforcing that law.").
' Id. at 161. "Animus furandi" is defined by Webster's On-Line dictionary as
"the intention to steal." Webster's On-Line Dictionary, available at http://www.webster-
dictionary.orgl definitionlAnimus+furandi (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
'9 The Court in Smith concluded:
[Wjhether we advert to writers on the common law, or the maritime law, or
the law of nations, we shall find that they universally treat of piracy as an
offence against the law of nations, and that its true definition by that law is
[Vol. 70:2
2004-051 SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN: 'THE DOOR IS STILL AJAR" 553
application of the law of nations in the ATS, it is notable that
the Smith court did not require uniformity as to all aspects of
the definition of piracy. Despite some "diversity of definitions,
in other respects," it was sufficient that the commentators
agreed on the core definition of piracy as "robbery upon the
sea."
Most of the core violations recognized by the lower
courts in prior ATS decisions rest on even clearer consensus
and precision than that in Smith. Before Sosa, the lower courts
repeatedly dismissed ATS claims that did not meet the
stringent "specific, universal and obligatory" test.
Environmental claims, for example, have been rejected on the
finding that the international law governing environmental
harm does not at this point impose clearly defined obligations.1 1
By contrast, torture is defined by an international agreement
ratified by 138 nations; genocide is defined and prohibited in a
convention ratified by 136 nations. 2 War crimes, crimes
against humanity, forced labor and slavery have all been the
subject of international development and definition involving
most of the countries of the world. In its first post-Sosa brief in
an ATS case, the executive branch did not challenge the Ninth
Circuit's finding that forced labor triggers ATS jurisdiction,
apparently accepting that a forced labor claim satisfies the
Sosa standard."n
The Court's discussion of the arbitrary detention claim
in Sosa provides additional guidance about which claims are
robbery upon the sea.... We have, therefore, no hesitation in declaring, that
piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea, and that it is
sufficiently and constitutionally defined by the fifth section of the act of 1819.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 162.
1 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 159-72 (2d Cir.
2003) (rejecting environmental claim); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161,
166-67 (5th Cir. 1999) (same). See also Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418
(9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim of fraud); Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103,
1104 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986)
(rejecting claim of censorship); De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, N.V., 570 F. Supp.
613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (rejecting claim of commercial tort).
'' See http://untreaty.un.orgENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/
treatyl4.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (ratifications of Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment); http://untreaty
.un.orgIENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treatyl.asp (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004) (ratifications of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide).
3 See Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
at 4, 17, 26, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56628), available at http://www.earthrights.orgunocal/dojunocalbrief.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
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not sufficient. Alvarez argued that an arrest would violate
international law if "exceeding positive authorization to detain
under the domestic law of some government, regardless of the
circumstances.' 4 The Supreme Court rejected this "broad"
definition of arbitrary arrest, noting that its "implications
would be breathtaking."' 5 But the Court's holding in Sosa is
quite narrow: "It is enough to hold that a single illegal
detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody
to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no
norm of customary international law so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy. " "
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Sosa not because it objected to the standard applied,
but rather because it disagreed with the application of the
stringent standard to the Sosa facts. This holding falls within
the parameters set by lower court ATS decisions. The Ninth
Circuit had split on the application of this standard to
Alvarez's facts by a vote of 6-5. Compared to prior cases, Sosa
was clearly an outlier: no ATS claim had ever survived based
on abuse comparable to that proved by Alvarez. Accordingly,
the Court's statement that it rejected unnamed prior federal
court authority on arbitrary detention "to the extent it supports
Alvarez's position"0 7 is difficult to apply. None of the prior
arbitrary detention cases involved brief detentions in the
absence of other abuses, such as torture, and in none of the
cases were the detainees "transfer[red] to lawful authorities"
for "a prompt arraignment" after less than a day."' In Sosa, the
"" Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2743.
"' Id. at 2744-45. The Court held that a violation of a binding international
norm would require conduct more egregious than a mere violation of domestic arrest
procedures:
Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary detention that the
civilized world accepts as binding customary international law requires a
factual basis beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority.
... In any event, the label would never fit the reckless policeman who botches
his warrant, even though that same officer might pay damages under
municipal law.
Id. at 2768-69.
' Id. at 2769.
17 Id. at 2768 n.27.
o8 The cases cited by Alvarez all awarded damages for detentions without any
pretense of lawful authority, not for the technical violations of arresting authority that
concerned the Sosa Court. In addition, all involved physical abuse and/or much longer
periods of detention. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 170 (D. Mass.
1995) (detentions of fourteen hours to two days while being tortured); Paul v. Avril, 901
F. Supp. 330, 334 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (one plaintiff held for under ten hours, tortured and
permanently injured); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
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Court seemed animated by the view that the problem with
Alvarez's arrest was a technicality, a fact setting that is not
present in any of the earlier cases.
Justice Scalia correctly recognized that the majority
endorsed the same standard applied by the lower courts to
date, including by the Ninth Circuit in this very case: "ITlhe
verbal formula it applied is the same verbal formula that the
Court explicitly endorses."'0 9 Moreover, this was the standard
proposed by Alvarez and the amici who submitted briefs on his
behalf. A brief filed on behalf of international law scholars, for
example, summarized the pre-Sosa precedents as applying the
statute "to impose civil liability for only the most serious
violations of international law":'1
To date, the federal courts have engaged in a careful and measured
analysis of the individual claims raised in ATCA cases, accepting
only well-established, universally recognized norms of international
law. Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, the federal courts have
functioned as effective gatekeepers in ATCA cases, allowing only
claims that are well-established under customary international law
(and recognized by the United States) to proceed."'
The Supreme Court in Sosa focused attention on the
narrowness of the standard and the need for caution in
defining ATS jurisdiction. The Court also rejected efforts to
extend actionable international torts to those based on
technical violations of domestic law. But the heart and soul of
ATS jurisprudence remain intact: redress for individuals who
have suffered egregious violations of their human rights.
V. CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AND COMPLICITY IN HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS POST-SOSA
Leading up to the Supreme Court decision, much of the
debate over the ATS centered on its application to corporate
defendants. Several business groups filed amicus briefs
arguing that enforcing corporate liability for human rights
violations in U.S. courts would severely hamper U.S. business
around the world."' This dispute implicated two legal issues not
(one plaintiff held for more than four years, another arrested and never charged or
released).
109 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2775.
... Brief of Amici Curiae National and Foreign Legal Scholars in Support of
Respondents at "1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339).
I d. at *18-19.
... See Brief of Amici Curiae National Foreign Trade Council et al. at 4-5,
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raised by Sosa but central to post-Sosa litigation. First,
corporate liability requires a finding that a particular
international norm applies to private legal entities such as
corporations. Second, many corporate cases involve allegations
that corporations have been complicit in human rights
violations committed by others, requiring analysis of the
standards for determining vicarious liability.
These questions turn on the resolution of a basic choice
of law issue: In an ATS case, what law governs who is bound by
a norm? Sosa confirmed that federal courts adjudicate ATS
claims as an exercise of their power to recognize federal
common law claims for violations of certain international law
norms. Consistent with the Supreme Court approach to the
ATS, lower courts addressing the choice of law question
generally have held that ATS claims are founded in federal
common law, but that the federal courts should look to
international law both to define the elements of the violation
and to determine who is bound by a given norm.
A. International Norms Apply to Corporate Defendants
In Sosa, the Court indicated general agreement with
this approach. In a footnote addressing the liability of private
actors, the Court cited with approval two decisions that relied
on international law to define who is governed by a given
international law norm:
A related consideration is whether international law extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator
being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation
or individual. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 791-795 (C.A.D.C.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient
consensus in 1984 that torture by private actors violates
international law), with Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-241
(C.A.2 1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private
actors violates international law).'
1
The Court in this note indicated that international law
determines which actors are bound by particular international
law norms. The Court also recognized that some international
norms apply to private actors--corporations as well as
individuals.
Sosa (No. 03-339), available at 2004 WL 162760. See also Brief for the National
Association of Manufacturers at 4-5, Sosa (No. 03-339), available at 2004 WL 199236.
1' Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.20.
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In Kadic, one of the cases cited by the Supreme Court,
the Second Circuit held that "evolving standards of
international law govern who is within the [ATS] jurisdictional
grant."14 Kadic concluded that the prohibition of genocide
applies to private actors by reviewing a range of authorities,
including the Nuremberg charter, a 1946 General Assembly
resolution, the international convention against genocide, and
the U.S. statute implementing that convention. '  These
authorities indicated that the prohibition on genocide extends
to private actors. In contrast, Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren
examined international documents on torture and concluded
that the prohibition applies only to torture committed under
color of law, and not to purely private torture.11
International tribunals have applied human rights and
humanitarian norms to corporations at least since World War
II, when the Nuremberg Tribunal made clear that norms
applicable to "persons" applied to legal persons as well as
individuals. Organizations were declared to be criminal if their
purpose was to commit or facilitate crimes detailed in the
Charter. '
The handful of courts that have considered the issue
under the ATS have all agreed that the international norms
that apply to private individuals also apply to corporations."' In
14 Kadic v. Karadik, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989)).
"' See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42 (citing Article 6 of the Agreement and Charter
Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal (punishing "persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds," regardless of whether the offenders acted "as
individuals or as members of organizations"); G.A. Res. 96(I), 1 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1, at 188-89 (1946) (declaring "that genocide is a crime under international
law that is condemned by the civilized world, whether the perpetrators are 'private
individuals, public officials or statesmen.'"); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. IV, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States Feb. 23, 1989) ("{pEersons
committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."); Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988) (criminalizing acts of genocide
without regard to whether the offender is acting under color of law); see id. § 1091(a)
("[wihoever" commits genocide shall be punished, if the crime is committed within the
United States or by a U.S. national); id. § 1091(d).
116 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
... Nuremberg Judgment, The Accused Organizations, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted
in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947). See Case No. 57, The I.G. Farben Trial, U.S. Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 Aug. 1947-July 29, 1948, 10 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 1; 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS 1108, 1132, 1140, INT'L L. REP. 676 (1948).
18 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000);
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Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., for
example, the court undertook an exhaustive review of ATS
decisions and international precedents and concluded that "a
considerable body of United States and international precedent
indicates that corporations may be liable for violations of
international law. . . .""' The Sosa decision validated the
approach of the lower courts.
B. Vicarious Liability and Complicity in Human Rights
Violations
In a recent submission to the Ninth Circuit, the
executive branch argued that aiding and abetting liability is
not so clearly established as to support ATS jurisdiction after
Sosa."' This misses the point in two ways. First, it is simply not
true: for over 200 years, international law has recognized
accomplice liability. But even if international law left a gap in
the definition of vicarious liability, federal common law could
look to federal standards to supply an appropriate standard.
Sosa does not require that every ancillary rule applied in an
ATS case meet the level of international consensus required for
the definition of the underlying violation. As in any case in
which the federal courts exercise discretion to recognize federal
common law, the courts will fashion rules to fill gaps,
borrowing from the most analogous body of law.
At the time the ATS was enacted, the federal courts
clearly recognized accomplice liability for violations of
international law.'"' In a 1795 opinion cited by the Court in
Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Estate of Rodriguez v.
Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Doe v. Unocal Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
.. 244 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
120 See Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
at 7-8, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-
56628), available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/dojunocalbrief.pdf (last visited
Jan. 21, 2005).
12 So did William Blackstone, the main source relied upon by the Supreme
Court in its analysis of the original intent of the ATS. In his discussion of piracy,
Blackstone recognized broad liability for those aiding pirates in any manner.
By the statute 8 Geo. I. c. 24, the trading with known pirates, or furnishing
them with stores or ammunition, or fitting out any vessel for that purpose, or
in any wise consulting, combining, confederating, or corresponding with them
... shall be deemed piracy: and all accessories to piracy, are declared to be
principal pirates ....
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 66-73 (Dublin,
The Company of Booksellers 1775).
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Sosa, Attorney General Bradford noted that liability for
violations of the law of nations extends to those "committing,
aiding, or abetting" such violations.2 Several of the classic
eighteenth-century cases applying international law in
criminal prosecutions invoked accessory liability. In Talbot v.
Janson," for example, the Court found the defendant liable for
aiding in the unlawful capture of a neutral ship."' Similarly,
Henfield's Case' recognized liability for "committing, aiding or
abetting hostilities" in violation of the law of nations. 6
International law today continues to recognize accomplice
liability. Several World War II cases found defendants guilty of
war crimes and crimes against humanity as accomplices to the
crimes.2 ' Modern treaties incorporate accessory liability, and
the modern international criminal tribunals have applied the
international law definition of aiding and abetting liability. The
statute of the International Criminal Court, for example,
assigns liability to a person who, "[flor the purpose of
facilitating the commission" of a crime, "aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission ... ""
" 1 U.S. Op. Att'y. Gen. 57, 59 (1795) (discussing the criminal and civil
liability of U.S. citizens who joined a French attack on a British colony in Sierra
Leone).
"' 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
14 Id. at 156-57.
'" 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
... Id. at 1103.
127 See, e.g., The Zyklon B Case (Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others), 1 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (German industrialists
convicted of supplying poison gas to Nazi concentration camps based on proof that they
knew the purpose for which the gas was to be used); United States v. Flick, 6 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1, 1216-23 (1949) (Flick convicted for knowingly contributing
financial support to the Nazis); United States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw NO.
101081, 1169-72 (1952) (pharmaceutical industrialists convicted because they supplied
experimental vaccines to the Nazis knowing that the vaccines would be used in illegal
medical experiments on concentration camp inmates).
" The Genocide Convention prohibits both complicity and conspiracy to
commit genocide, as well as prohibiting genocide itself. Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 113, at 277. The Torture
Convention requires states to criminalize any act "that constitutes complicity or
participation in torture." Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 4(1), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 113
(entered into force June 26, 1987). Similarly, the Supplementary Slavery Convention
establishes liability for "being an accessory" to the enslavement of another person, or
"being a party to a conspiracy to accomplish any such acts." Supplementary Convention
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, art. 6, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, 43.
12. Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art. 25, §3(c). The Rwanda tribunal, quoting an English case
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Sosa makes no mention of vicarious liability and the
Supreme Court gave no explicit instructions as to how to
resolve such collateral issues. The Court cannot have intended
that all aspects of an ATS claim be determined by international
law. International law as a rule establishes only general
parameters and leaves domestic courts to determine the
manner by which its rules will be enforced. The standard
practice of federal courts enforcing federal common law claims
provides guidance for resolution of the countless issues that
arise in federal court litigation. Where federal law does not
provide a clear rule, the courts borrow from analogous federal
or even state rules, as appropriate, to answer ancillary issues.'
Here, a court might ask first whether international law
provides a clear answer, then look to federal vicarious liability
standards as necessary to fill any gaps."'
VI. THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE: THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
The Sosa Court recognized that certain discretionary
doctrines may bar adjudication of ATS claims, including the
requirement that plaintiffs exhaust local remedies.'32 In
addition, the opinion contains a cryptic reference to the role of
the executive branch in cases that may have foreign policy
with clear parallels to corporate liability today, stated:
[A]n indifference to the result of the crime does not of itself negate abetting.
If one man deliberately sells to another a gun to be used for murdering a
third, he may be indifferent about whether the third lives or dies and
interested only in the cash profit to be made out of the sale, but he can still be
an aider and abettor.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998), $ 539 (quoting Nat'l Coal Bd. v. Gamble, 1 Q.B. 11 (1959)),
available at http:// www.ictr.orgfENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay00l.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
"s Federal courts develop federal common law in a limited set of
circumstances, some of which apply directly to application of the ATS: to fill gaps in a
federal statutory scheme, to fulfill congressional intent, and to protect uniquely federal
interests in a few areas that include matters involving international law. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 333-34 (2d ed. 1994).
... This is the issue that was before the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc in Doe v.
Unocal Corporation, but is now off the docket because the case was settled. See supra
note 22. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003) (Nos. 00-
56603, 00-56628), reh'g granted en banc. The two-judge majority applied international
vicarious liability principles. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976, at *11 ((9th Cir.
Sept. 18, 2002) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195). The concurring opinion
applied federal complicity rules. Id. at *24-36. Despite the heated disagreement, the
two approaches derived virtually identical standards from the different bodies of law
and came to the same result when applying their standards to the facts.
'"' Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004).
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implications. In footnote 21, the Court referred to "a policy of
case-specific deference to the political branches. " " The Court
indicated one set of particularly controversial cases that might
warrant such deference:
[Tihere are now pending in federal district court several class actions
seeking damages from various corporations alleged to have
participated in, or abetted, the regime of apartheid that formerly
controlled South Africa. See In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (JPML 2002) (granting a motion to
transfer the cases to the Southern District of New York). The
Government of South Africa has said that these cases interfere with
the policy embodied by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
which "deliberately avoided a 'victors' justice' approach to the crimes
of apartheid and chose instead one based on confession and
absolution, informed by the principles of reconciliation,
reconstruction, reparation and goodwill ...... The United States has
agreed .... In such cases, there is a strong argument that federal
courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of
the case's impact on foreign policy. Cf. Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2255-2256 (2004) (discussing the State
Department's use of statements of interest in cases involving the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et
seq. V
34
Unfortunately, the Court did not identify which
characteristics of the apartheid cases support the finding that
executive branch views might be entitled to "serious weight."
Nor did the court explain under what doctrine, and applying
what standards of review, the lower courts should evaluate
such opinions. The one citation is to a case decided just days
before, Republic of Austria v. Altmann."' The Court's discussion
of executive branch views in Altmann itself was cryptic. The
Court invited the executive branch to express its views not
about the interpretation of the statutory scheme, but rather
about the foreign policy issues implicated by a particular case. 3'
133 Id.
" Id. (parallel citations omitted).
131 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004). In November 2004, a federal judge dismissed the
consolidated South African Apartheid cases for reasons largely unrelated to the
concerns raised in this Supreme Court footnote. In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 2004 WL 2722204. Relying more on
Justice Scalia's opinion in Sosa than on the majority decision, Judge Sprizzo found that
the conduct alleged by plaintiffs did not trigger jurisdiction under the ATS.
13' The dissent in Altmann questioned the majority's invitation to the
executive branch to comment on the application of sovereign immunity. 124 S. Ct. at
2274-75. In reply, the majority opinion stated in a footnote: "We do not hold .. .that
executive intervention could or would trump considered application of the [Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act's] more neutral principles; we merely note that the
Executive's views on questions within its area of expertise merit greater deference than
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But the examples Altmann cited in support of this invitation all
addressed issues on which the law governing sovereign
immunity was unclear: the propriety of seizure of diplomatic
property to satisfy a judgment or the immunity of a successor
state.37 The proper interpretation of the breadth of sovereign
immunity is a legal issue on which the courts traditionally look
to the executive branch for guidance.
By contrast, the administration of President George W.
Bush has argued that ATS cases are non-justiciable not
because of legal impediments, but because of their purported
impact on business investments or relations with foreign
governments. The difficult issue for the courts is the degree of
deference to be accorded executive branch submissions when
plaintiffs challenge the factual basis for the administration's
views, offering conflicting evidence about the potential impact
and about U.S. interests and policies. The cryptic Sosa footnote
states that "there is a strong argument" that the court should
"give serious weight" to the views submitted in the apartheid
cases. But those cases reflect the unique history of South Africa
and its transition from apartheid to democracy. The
government that replaced the apartheid regime was recognized
internationally as representative both of the majority of the
nation and, in particular, of the victims of past human rights
abuses. The transition included a negotiated process by which
abuses would be investigated and perpetrators given the
opportunity to testify about their actions in return for amnesty.
When the democratically elected, representative government of
South Africa objected to the impact of the U.S. litigation on the
negotiated transition process, the executive branch asked the
courts to defer to this judgment. All of these factors provide
support for the Court's suggestion that there is a "strong
argument" that executive branch views "in such cases" are
entitled to "serious weight.""
This context is important, for the constitutional division
of powers requires that federal courts subject executive branch
its opinions regarding the scope of a congressional enactment." Id. at 2255 n.23. Note
the limited deference given to executive branch views of the proper interpretation of
the scope of a statute. In keeping with this approach, the Supreme Court in Sosa
barely mentioned the executive branch's arguments against its interpretation of the
ATS.
S137 124 S. Ct. at 2255 n.21.
'1 Exhaustion of domestic remedies might be a more appropriate doctrine on
which to challenge the litigation, given that South Africa also has a functioning judicial
system.
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submissions to review. In First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba,'3' Justice Douglas warned about the
unconstitutionality of granting the executive branch the power
to determine when litigation must be dismissed on foreign
policy grounds, recognizing that unquestioning deference would
render the Court "a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch
which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire,
but not others.' '.. In that case, six of the justices in separate
opinions concluded that executive branch views were not
binding on the judiciary. As stated by Justice Powell, "I would
be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the
judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invoking
its jurisdiction. Such a notion, in the name of the doctrine of
separation of powers, seems to me to conflict with that very
doctrine.""' Justice Brennan added, "The Executive Branch...
cannot by simple stipulation change a political question into a
cognizable claim.""' Noting that six members of the Court
shared his view on this point, he concluded that "the
representations of the Department of State are entitled to
weight for the light they shed on the permutation and
combination of factors underlying the act of state doctrine. But
they cannot be determinative.".4 3
The Court has reviewed the coherence of executive
branch submissions even when ultimately following their
guidance.1" Lower courts have adopted this position as well. In
"' 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
14 Id. at 773 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 788-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 790 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968), where the Court refused to follow the executive branch's views. The concurring
justices harshly rejected any obligation to defer to the State Department's views:
We deal here with the basic allocation of power between the States and the
Nation. Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot vary from
day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department. Today, we are
told, Oregon's statute does not conflict with the national interest. Tomorrow
it may. But, however, that may be, the fact remains that the conduct of our
foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the National
Government, not to the probate courts of the several States.
Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"' Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), for example, addressed a challenge to
currency restrictions imposed on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. While recognizing
that the executive branch's views were entitled to deference, the Court reviewed the
underlying facts and concluded that the restrictions were justified based on "the
evidence presented to both the District Court and the Court of Appeals." Id. at 243. In
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 422 (2003), the court followed executive
branch recommendations after concluding that "[t]he approach taken [by the executive
branch] serves to resolve ... several competing matters of national concern" at issue in
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Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, for example, the
D.C. Circuit declared, "whatever weight the opinion of the
Department, as a presumed expert in the foreign relations
field, is able to garner, deference cannot extend to blatant
disregard of countervailing evidence." 145 Thus, the views of the
executive branch are entitled to "respectful consideration" but
cannot be given conclusive weight.146
The pattern of executive intervention in ATS cases
under the administration of President George W. Bush
illustrates the need for a searching review. In a series of cases,
the administration opposed judicial review of cases alleging
egregious behavior because of the possible impact on business
investments or because of weakly supported claims about the
likely reaction of foreign governments. 147 As I have argued
elsewhere, the Bush Administration's opposition to human
rights litigation coincides with the filing of lawsuits against
politically powerful defendants: corporations, foreign
government officials, and the U.S. government itself. Although
couched in terms of separation of powers, the campaign seeks
to protect allies from accountability for egregiously wrongful
behavior. 148
Recent Bush administration submissions also have been
criticized as contrary to long-standing U.S. policy. In Doe v.
ExxonMobil,14 for example, plaintiffs alleged that the oil giant
paid the Indonesian military to provide protection for
operations conducted in the midst of a civil war in the Aceh
province with the full knowledge that the military had
employed genocide, murder and torture in its efforts to
maintain order. The State Department legal advisor suggested
the dispute.
141 Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 840 F.2d 26, 36-37 (D. C. Cir. 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
146 Kadic v. KaradEi, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Allied Bank
Int'l, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985) (decision to invoke the act of state doctrine,
"may be guided but not controlled by the position, if any, articulated by the executive
as to the applicability vel non of the doctrine to a particular set of facts. Whether to
invoke the act of state doctrine is ultimately and always a judicial question."); Belgrade
v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[Tlhe views of
the executive branch often will have an important bearing on a court's determination,
especially where the concern is possible conflict with a coordinate branch of
government, [but] they are not conclusive.").
147 See Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances, supra note 25, at 196-202.
148 Id. at 170.
149 Complaint at 14-19, Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. filed June
19, 2001), available at http://wwwlaborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/index.html
(last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
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that the litigation would harm U.S. interests because it would
decrease cooperation with counter-terrorism measures, deter
foreign investment in Indonesia, and give foreign business
competitors an advantage over U.S. businesses." In response,
plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a former State
Department official who challenged the Bush administration's
policy assumptions."' He noted that "an honest assessment of
Indonesia's human rights records by American governmental
institutions has always been an integral part of United States
foreign policy toward Indonesia."' Plaintiffs also challenged the
administration's portrayal of U.S. foreign policy, noting the
U.S. interest in "ensuring that U.S. corporate entities comply
with international human rights obligations in their conduct
abroad."15
If the executive branch continues to maintain an
implacable opposition to all human rights litigation in U.S.
courts, battles over the proper weight to be given to its views
are likely to be a major issue in post-Sosa litigation. The Bush
administration fired the first salvo in a brief filed before the
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc in Doe v. Unocal Corporation."
" Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Court Judge for the District of
Columbia, submitted in Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. July, 29, 2002),
available at http://www.laborrights.org/projects/corporate/exxon/stateexxonmobile.pdf
(last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
151 Affidavit of Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the Clinton administration, submitted in Doe
v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2002), reprinted in Terry
Collingsworth, The Alien Tort Claims Act - A Vital Tool for Preventing Corporations
from Violating Human Rights, Attachment C, available at http://laborrights.org/
publicationlATCA.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
... Id. at 5, 14. Koh also observed that repeated criticism by the Clinton
administration, the second Bush administration and Congress has not led the
Indonesian government to cease cooperation with the U.S. government, and that it is
not plausible to predict that Indonesia will do so in the future because of a lawsuit filed
by private parties in a U.S. federal court. See id. at 5, 14-17.
.. Id. at 8, 19. The administration itself has endorsed this policy, stressing
the relationship between the rule of law and respect for human rights and economic
progress:
These principles are vital to our own economic security here at home and are
the only sustainable way for United States companies to engage abroad....
[Ilt is good not only for American business, but also for the global investment
climate that American firms be the best corporate citizens possible.
Id. at 8-9, 19 (quoting E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
and Business Affairs, who served both President Clinton and the second President
Bush, Announcement of "Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights," U.S.
Department of State, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.state.gov/www/
policy-remarks/2000/001220 wayne_ principles.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004)).
" Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628) at
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The brief made no effort to argue either that forced labor fails
to meet the Sosa standard or that adjudication of the case
would harm relations with Burma. Such an argument would
have been difficult to support: the U.S. government has
repeatedly criticized the abusive military regime governing
Burma and has imposed strict economic sanctions." In
addition, the Clinton administration informed the district court
that adjudication of the case against Unocal would have no
impact on U.S. foreign policy.5 ' Instead, the Bush executive
branch brief asserted that any recognition of corporate liability
for aiding and abetting egregious human rights abuses, in any
case, would interfere with U.S. foreign policy because it would
deter foreign investment and tie the hands of the executive
branch." ' Plaintiffs challenged this extreme view, arguing that
deterrence of knowing complicity in violations of core
international human rights norms would have no detrimental
impact on overall investment or U.S. policy." In such cases, the
courts must decide what level of consideration to afford
executive branch claims about the impact of particular cases or
doctrines on U.S. foreign policy. The executive branch's factual
claims about the impact of litigation should be the legitimate
subject of debate and challenge, as "these predictions about the
impact of the litigation appear far more subjective than factual,
more designed to protect powerful defendants than to protect
U.S. foreign policy."1 .
http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (Aug. 2004). After the Supreme Court
decided Sosa, the Circuit requested additional briefing. The briefs are available at
http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (last updated Oct. 15, 2004). The case
has now been settled. See supra note 22.
11 See the description of sanctions imposed by President Clinton in National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
156 See Letter of Michael J. Matheson, Acting Legal Advisor (July 8, 1997),
reprinted in Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329,
362 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Matheson Letter] (stating that "adjudication of the
claims based on the allegations of torture and slavery would not prejudice or impede
the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with the current government of Burma").
5' Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note
154, at 11-17.
'58 Plaintiffs also argue that this submission ignores the Court's invitation to
raise "case-specific" foreign policy concerns, focusing rather on the same kind of
sweeping objections to the ATS that the Court rejected in Sosa. Appellants' Response to
United States Amicus Curiae Brief at 25-32, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-5603, 00-56628, 00-57195, 00-57197) at
http://www.earthrights.orgunocal/index.shtml (Aug. 2004).
159 Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances, supra note 25, at 202.
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The highly politicized, extreme positions taken by the
executive branch under the leadership of President Bush may
ultimately undermine the respect normally accorded executive
branch views by the Supreme Court. In a series of decisions at
the end of the 2004 term, the Court refused to follow the
administration's guidance, even when couched in super-heated
national security terms."' It is striking that the Sosa opinion
makes no mention at all of the executive branch's views of the
case or of its overwrought description of the supposed danger
that ATS cases pose to U.S. foreign policy. Lower courts may
well take guidance from the Supreme Court's example and
reject the administration's demand that the courts decline to
adjudicate cases properly before them under the ATS.
CONCLUSION
Activists, scholars and corporate representatives have
speculated about the risks and benefits of broad application of
the ATS. One analysis went so far as to describe the statute as
"an awakening monster" that would cost the U.S. economy
billions of dollars."' At the same time, law review authors and
litigators have argued for inclusion of a long list of human
rights violations as possible ATS claims. Ignoring the two
extremes, the lower courts moved ahead cautiously, rejecting
far more claims than they accepted and issuing judgments only
in cases involving egregious human rights violations. The
Supreme Court validated their cautious approach in Sosa,
preserving a measured mechanism for human rights
accountability that affirms a narrow but very significant role
for U.S. domestic courts in providing redress for victims of
egregious human rights abuses. In the words of the Fildrtiga
court, ATS litigation represents "a small but important step in
the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from
brutal violence."''
" The Sosa decision was released the day after the Court issued opinions in
cases challenging the administration's detention of enemy combatants, Rasul v. Bush,
124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). In both
decisions, the Court rejected administration claims that the executive branch should be
given complete discretion to respond to the exigencies of the war against terror.
161 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (2003).
"' Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).

